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Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions 
David Barrus and Frank Scott 
 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.2 
 
BID LETTING FOR JANUARY 21, 2005 PARTS 1, 2, & 3: Have been 
advertised with 56 projects consisting of grade and drain with asphalt surface, 
guardrail, asphalt resurfacing, right-of-way mowing and litter removal, slide 
repair, fine turf mowing, bridge painting and cleaning, bridge deck restoration and 
waterproofing, culvert replacement, etc. Letting eve activities will be held at the 
Marriott’s Griffin Gate Resort in Lexington…Please note the attached revised 
reservation form from the Marriott Griffin Gate for the 2005 Kentucky 
Association of Highway Contractors Bid Lettings.3 
 
Understanding firms’ attempts to collude drives much of economists’ study of oligopoly. 
Detection and deterrence of collusion are perhaps the primary challenges of antitrust policy.4 In 
auction markets, collusion has attracted less attention than a general focus on design mechanisms 
and other factors affecting the competitiveness of such markets.5 Much of the attention paid to 
collusion in auction markets has been motivated by price fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies in 
public procurement auctions.6 
Bid-rigging schemes can take a variety of forms. Sometimes all participants in an auction 
are part of an overt conspiracy, and then the challenge becomes determining which conspirator 
will win the auction and how other conspirators will be compensated. Things change somewhat 
if non-conspirators participate in the auction. Accommodating behavior by co-conspirators often 
                                                          
2 Smith (1776), Book I, Ch. X, Part II. 
3 Kentucky Association of Highway Contractors newsletter: Highway Highlights, January 18, 2005. 
4 Porter (2005), p. 147. 
5 See, for example, Klemperer (2004).  
6 Hendricks, McAfee, and Williams (2015) provide an overview of this literature. 
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takes the form of submitting complementary bids above (in a procurement auction) the 
predetermined winner’s bid. If the collusive behavior is overt, it violates federal antitrust laws in 
the United States.7 
Various methods have been proposed for detecting collusion in auction markets. As 
Harrington (2008), Porter and Zona (1993), and others have noted, however, refraining from 
bidding is another form that collusion may take. Such behavior may be overt, if it is the result of 
explicit communication among firms, or tacit, if it arises without overt behavior. While overt 
agreements not to bid have been the object of study, we are not aware of any empirical analysis 
of tacit refusals to bid in procurement auctions. 
 During the 1980s there were hundreds of bid-rigging prosecutions and convictions in 
public procurement auctions across the country.8 Since then, government officials have 
aggressively monitored bidding behavior, and there has been a relatively reduced emphasis on §1 
Sherman Act prosecutions since the 1980s. That does not mean that concerns over the 
competitiveness of bidding, especially in highway procurement auctions, have gone away. 
Instead, the trend has been toward single-bidder auctions, with resulting higher prices for public 
transportation projects.9 
 The difference that a second bidder can make in highway procurement auctions is sizable. 
As can be seen in Table 1, in Kentucky during the 2005-07 period 64 percent of asphalt paving 
projects only had one bidder, and 91 percent had one or two bidders. Winning bids for single-bid 
asphalt projects averaged 2.20 percent above the state highway engineer’s estimate of the cost of 
the job. Winning bids when there were two bidders averaged 13.62 percent below the engineer’s 
                                                          
7 Werden (2004) extensively discusses the definition and proof of collusive agreements under the antitrust laws. 
8 USGAO (1990): http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/142779.pdf.  
9 AASHTO/FHWA Survey on Construction Cost Increases and Competition, April 2006. 
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estimate, and with three bidders the low bid averaged 16.82 percent below the engineer’s 
estimate. It is clear that even a single other bidder sharply constrains a firm’s ability to raise 
prices. The nearly 16 percent difference made by a second bidder cost Kentucky taxpayers nearly 
$100 million of the $593 million spent on paving contracts during the 2005-07 period. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of All KYTC Projects in Kentucky, 2005–2007 
 
 
At one level, the goal of this paper is to explore the nature of bidding in highway 
procurement auctions. At another level, we hope to add to economists’ understanding of tacit 
collusion in oligopoly markets. The primary question is whether so many auctions attract only a 
single bidder because rival firms are coordinating their bids. We start by reviewing the history of 
bid rigging in the asphalt industry and methods used to detect collusion in auctions. We discuss 
how procedural mechanics of highway procurement auctions and economic aspects of asphalt 
Number of 
Bidders
Asphalt 
Projects
All Other 
Projects*
Asphalt 
Projects
All Other 
Projects*
Asphalt 
Projects
All Other 
Projects*
1 677 154 429.1 737.6 2.20 2.38
2 284 223 120.3 800.8 -13.62 -6.02
3 72 211 33.2 488.3 -16.82 -13.22
4 24 153 8.7 174.4 -16.87 -16.02
5 3 83 1.8 144.0 -14.15 -19.52
6 43 49.8 -17.22
7 23 44.0 -21.30
8 12 17.1 -16.07
9 7 4.6 -26.08
12 1 0.7 -11.05
Grand Total 1060 910 593.1 2,461.1 -3.81 -10.39
*These other projects include grade and drain, bridge, mowing, concrete, etc. Some of these projects have 
asphalt components as part of the project
Number of Projects
Total Value of Projects 
($ in millions)
Over or Under Engineer's 
Estimate (%)
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paving create a bidding environment that facilitates coordination in the repeated bidding game 
that rival contractors engage in. We then determine feasible service areas for all asphalt 
contractors in Kentucky and analyze bidding behavior to see what factors influence both the 
decision to bid and how much to bid. We find that, in many parts of the state, county boundaries 
create a natural focal point for bidding that helps firms solve their repeated coordination game by 
refraining from bidding in rival firms’ territories. 
 
Bid Rigging in the Asphalt Industry 
During the period of analysis in this paper, there is no evidence of overt collusion in Kentucky, 
nor is there any suspicion of illegal activity, even though the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 
annually gathered highway contractors for a bid-letting meeting and sponsored a social function 
the night before. Since several principals and companies in the present empirical analysis were 
implicated in bid rigging and illegal collusion in Kentucky during the early 1980s, a brief 
overview of past overt collusion in highway procurement auctions is warranted.10 
Antitrust enforcement changed its focus in the early 1980s, switching from large 
monopoly cases to price fixing and collusion. A pattern of highway bid rigging was uncovered in 
Tennessee and in other states. In Tennessee, contractors gathered in a Nashville hotel the night 
before bid lettings to determine who would be the winning (low) bidder. Other contractors would 
                                                          
10 The owner of Mountain Enterprises, an asphalt paving company in eastern Kentucky, provided the following 
description of how the collusion worked:  
 
It was agreed that Kentucky Virginia Stone would take both of the jobs available at that letting and 
the two jobs available at the next letting were then split up. So that Mountain Enterprises got one 
of the four, Kentucky Virginia Stone got three of the four, and that roughly split or equaled out the 
tonnages on those four jobs. These were the first four jobs which were made subject to the 
agreement between Kentucky Virginia Stone and Mountain Enterprises ....They would work out 
who was going to get which job and then information would be passed so that someone could 
either submit a complementary bid or not bid (Lawson, 1983, pp. 9-10). 
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submit complementary (higher) bids, in return for payoffs from the winner or the promise of 
being the low bidder in a future auction (rotation of low bidders).11 By 1984 the federal 
investigation of highway bidding had expanded into 29 states, with 181 corporations and 189 
individuals pleading guilty, 21 corporations and 25 individuals being convicted at trial, and 16 
corporations and 22 individuals being acquitted.12 In all, there were over 600 highway bid-
rigging cases during the 1980s.13 
Since the 1980s the Department of Justice has shifted its emphasis from the prosecution 
of bid rigging, in no small part because of a general belief that overt collusion occurs less 
frequently due to heavy prosecution during the 1980s and better methods, such as wiretaps, for 
detecting bid rigging. This is not to say, however, that highway procurement auctions are highly 
competitive. In an August 2005 meeting of the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Subcommittee on Construction, the committee identified 
single-bid contracts and decreasing competition as major concerns. According to a survey 
commissioned by AASHTO (2006), the average number of bidders per project declined from 
4.24 in 2002 to 3.36 in 2005. In Kentucky the average number of bidders declined from 2.94 in 
2002 to 2.18 in 2005.14 As is evident in Table 1, single-bid contracts are more prevalent in 
asphalt resurfacing projects than other highway construction or maintenance projects. These facts 
motivate our analysis. The question remains whether the high level of single-bid contracts 
represents an efficient equilibrium or is the result of tacit collusion.  
                                                          
11 Sniffen (1982).  
12 Sniffen (1984)  
13 Ryan (2004).  
14 Two major reasons cited by departments of transportation for the decline of bids were industry consolidation and 
increased work with the same number of contractors. Data from Kentucky, however, indicate that industry 
consolidation was not a problem: From 2005 to 2007 the average number of projects per firm was 10.4 in Kentucky, 
while the average from 1994 to 2007 was 11.2 projects per firm.  
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Detecting Collusion in Auctions 
Detecting collusion and cartels has long been a primary concern of industrial organization 
economists (e.g., Stigler, 1964). Both Porter (2005) and Harrington (2008) have suggested that 
economists are best positioned to play the role of detective—diagnosing either explicit or tacit 
cooperation among firms. Concomitant with increased focus on price fixing and bid rigging by 
federal antitrust investigators in the 1980s, economists began paying greater attention to, and 
worked to develop methods to identify, collusive behavior in auctions (e.g., Graham and 
Marshall, 1987; McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Isaac and Walker (1985) investigated bid rigging 
in sealed bid auctions and the effect of non-cooperating bidders in a laboratory experiment 
setting. Building on theoretical and empirical research on bid rigging in auctions, both 
Klemperer (2002) and Marshall and Marx (2009) discussed the importance of auction design in 
thwarting collusion.15 
Highway procurement auctions have been a particular area of focus both because of 
readily available data and high susceptibility to collusion. Funderburk (1974) described an early 
use of economic analysis to identify the existence of a conspiracy among bidders for liquid 
asphalt contracts with the Oklahoma transportation department. Feinstein, Block, and Nold 
(1985) theoretically and empirically analyzed information asymmetries between highway 
construction cartels and the states that purchased their services. They found that cartels actively 
fed misinformation to the North Carolina transportation department to change the purchaser’s 
(the state) expectation on what constituted a “good buy.”16 
                                                          
15 A thorough summary of this literature is contained in Hendricks, McAfee, and Williams (2015). 
16 Brannman and Klein (1992) also investigated highway construction bid rigging in North Carolina. 
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Porter and Zona (1993) developed an econometric test to detect bid rigging in highway 
procurement auctions. They focused specifically on auctions where there were more than two 
bids and attempted to detect “phantom” bidding. A phantom bid is a one that looks competitive 
because multiple firms are bidding; however, the identities of the low and high bidders are 
determined by the participating firms before the bids are submitted. This overt collusion gives 
the appearance that numerous firms are competing for a project, but in reality the winner of the 
bid is predetermined. 
Bajari and Ye (2003) developed econometric tools to detect collusive behavior and 
empirically analyzed data on highway seal-coating contracts in Minnesota, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota. They incorporated cost asymmetries among bidders in their model. Cost 
asymmetries arise due to firms’ locations, capacity constraints, and knowledge of local rules and 
regulations. They tested for conditional independence to determine whether bids were 
independent and for exchangeability to determine whether costs and not just the presence of 
competitors drove bid levels. Lastly, they took into account industry experts’ opinions about 
realistic distribution of markups to determine whether the market was competitive or collusive.  
The literature on collusion in auctions extends into other sectors including electricity, 
timber, the electromagnetic spectrum, public works, and the dairy industry. Focusing on the 
electricity industry in England and Wales, Fabra (2003) modeled tacit collusion in uniform-price 
and discriminatory auctions in a repeated setting that allowed firms to sustain collusive behavior. 
Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) controlled for demand conditions and found that a 
collusive model outperforms the “standard” model of non-cooperative behavior in Pacific 
Northwest timber auctions. Price (2008) extended Bajari and Ye’s (2003) model into timber 
auctions in British Columbia and incorporated the spatial distribution of bidders to detect 
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collusion. Cramton and Schwartz (2000) investigated the FCC’s simultaneous ascending auction 
design and found that it facilitated tacit collusion in spectrum auctions around the country. Lee 
and Hahn (2002) and Ishii (2009) analyzed bidding on public works projects in Korea and Japan, 
finding evidence of collusive behavior. Research has also focused on collusion in school milk 
procurement auctions during the 1980s and 1990s. Pesendorfer (2000), Porter and Zona (1999), 
Lee (1999), Lanzillotti (1996), and Scott (2000) analyzed bid rigging in Florida and Tennessee, 
Ohio, Texas, and Kentucky respectively.  
 
Highway Procurement Auctions 
Certain elements of highway procurement auctions, as well as political and geographical factors, 
create a market environment that facilitates collusive outcomes. Since the approach taken by the 
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) to procure construction and maintenance work is 
generally representative, we will use it as an example. There are many different types of projects 
to be carried out, ranging from constructing new roads, resurfacing existing roads, trimming trees 
and mowing grass, maintaining and replacing bridges, building fences, and painting lines. Of 
particular importance is that when certain funds are used, KYTC is required to separate funds by 
county, and so it usually separates projects by county.17  
For reasons discussed below, our primary interest is asphalt paving projects. Major 
asphalt jobs originate from a comprehensive, full planning process, are attached to a Six-Year 
Plan and State Transportation Improvement Plan, and are approved by the state legislature. 
Minor, routine asphalt resurfacing projects are typically initiated within KYTC and do not need 
                                                          
17 A KYTC transportation official stated that for certain types of projects designated “rural secondary,” the money 
must go to the specific counties. 
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to be approved by the legislature. The vast majority of the projects analyzed for this paper are 
minor resurfacing projects.18 
In Kentucky, projects are let on a monthly schedule, but this can vary from state to state. 
In most states, each project is advertised for a certain period of time, bid proposals and plans are 
available for purchase, and then bids are submitted. Most states require that contractors working 
for them must be prequalified and also require that bid proposal and/or project plans must be 
purchased.19 In Kentucky a project must be advertised 7–21 days before the project is let. Firms 
must purchase a bid proposal to be eligible to bid on a project. The bid proposal costs $10 and 
the names of firms that purchase bid proposals are publicly available the Friday before bids are 
due to KYTC headquarters. 
All firms in Kentucky must be pre-qualified by the transportation cabinet, and the list of 
pre-qualified firms is publicly available. Care is taken by KYTC that a contractor does not take 
on too much work, and officials hold meetings with all potential contractors on projects 
scheduled for the upcoming year to determine the letting schedule. Projects are moved around on 
the calendar in order to accommodate potential contractors. 
Sealed bids are opened and read aloud once a month at the Kentucky Transportation 
Cabinet. KYTC then analyzes the bids for 10 days before awarding a contract. The bids are 
analyzed to see if the bid is unbalanced, front-loaded, or if there is any indication of collusion.20 
The transportation cabinet looks at the overall total of each bid and compares it to the state 
highway engineer’s estimate. In some states the engineer’s estimate is available before the day of 
                                                          
18 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (2004). 
19 Anderson and Blaschke (2004). 
20 Kentucky and other states use the AASHTO Transport System, a program used to detect collusion. It can compare 
bids to the engineer’s estimate and the other contractors who bid It can also create reports on past bidding behavior, 
market prices, and price differences according to various parameters such as geography. 
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bidding, while in other states like Kentucky it is not available until after bids are opened. An 
informal rule in Kentucky is that if a bid is 7 percent over the engineer’s estimate it should be 
rejected, however, this rule is infrequently followed. If KYTC judges all aspects of the bid to be 
reasonable then the project is awarded, even if there is only one bidder.  
 
Economic Aspects of Asphalt Paving 
We focus on asphalt paving and do not consider other types of projects such as grade and drain, 
bridge work, mowing, etc. The important element of the asphalt paving process is the time 
constraint, which limits how far away from its plant a particular firm can bid—the firm’s feasible 
service area. Projects farther from a plant result in higher costs to the firm because asphalt is 
heavy and hence costly to transport. As a result, the geographic scope of the market for asphalt 
projects is much smaller than geographic market scope for road and bridge construction, 
mowing, and other highway maintenance projects.  
 Other factors relevant to asphalt production and paving are high start-up costs (some of 
which take the form of environmental permits), economies of scale at the plant level, potential 
problems of obtaining aggregate (sand and gravel), and the fact that hot-mix asphalt must be 
compacted while it is very hot. These factors greatly influence the competitive landscape faced 
by asphalt contractors bidding in procurement auctions. 
The process of paving a road begins with the extraction of rock (aggregate) from a quarry 
and the distillation of asphalt cement or bitumen from crude oil. The cost of producing asphalt 
varies as the prices of aggregate and asphalt cement vary. These two components are combined 
at high temperatures at an asphalt plant when asphalt cement is in liquid form. The resulting hot-
mix asphalt is dispensed into trucks and driven to the project site. Care has to be taken to not let 
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the mixture cool too much before compaction. It must be laid and compacted before the 
temperature of the mixture falls below 85°C (185°F). Below this temperature the asphalt starts to 
crack and will not set properly. 
Transportation of hot-mix asphalt from plant to project site is another significant cost. 
The trucks are often insulated and the bed is usually covered with a tarp. A general guideline is 
that hot-mix asphalt has two to three hours in an insulated truck before it becomes too cool.21 
However, an official of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet stated that between 45 and 60 
minutes from when the hot-mix asphalt is dispensed to when it is compacted is a more realistic 
time frame. This time frame is critical in determining the extent of a firm’s feasible service area. 
The calculation of feasible service areas is important in the analysis of tacit collusion, and is 
discussed further in the Data section. 
 
Coordination of Bidding in a Repeated Multistage Game 
There is considerable variation in the bidding environment faced by asphalt paving firms in 
Kentucky. Northern Kentucky and the greater Louisville area are large urban markets and can 
support multiple asphalt companies. In addition to dense public road networks, there is 
considerable commercial demand for asphalt paving and so the market environment is very 
competitive with multiple firms. In many other parts of the state, demand for asphalt paving is 
sufficient to support geographically dispersed oligopolists whose feasible service territories only 
partially overlap.22 It is in this type of market environment that strategic interactions among 
                                                          
21 AASHTO, (2000). 
22 In eastern Kentucky the market is much thinner, because of sparse population and negligible commercial paving 
demand. Since the 1980s, the region has been served by one multi-plant firm, which operates each of its plants on a 
rotating basis with transient plant and paving crews. The market environment resembles natural monopoly, in that 
there only seems to be enough business to support one efficient-sized firm. 
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firms are important. The prevalence of these oligopoly/duopoly markets is demonstrated in 
Figure 1, which illustrates every asphalt plant in Kentucky approved to bid on state contracts 
during the sample period.23 As can be seen, 31.7 percent of the 120 counties in Kentucky did not 
have an asphalt plant located within the county, 60.0 percent of counties had one plant, and 8.4 
percent had more than one. 
Bidding in a competitive environment has been thoroughly discussed by other authors. 
We have little to add, except to use competitive areas as a benchmark for comparison. Bidding 
under natural monopoly is straightforward: How high above the state engineer’s estimate can a 
firm bid and not be rejected by KYTC?24 Oligopoly bidding gets interesting: If firms are able to 
coordinate their bidding behavior, then how do they determine which firm should win a 
particular auction, how rotate winners, and how the designated losers should bid, if at all? 
This bidding scenario thus has elements of a repeated multistage game, where in the first 
stage firms decide whether to enter a particular auction, and in the second stage those who enter 
decide what price to bid. Collusive coordination requires either side payments or rotation of 
winners. Side payments are by definition overt and illegal. Complementary bids and refraining 
from bidding are illegal if firms directly and overtly agree to pursue such strategies. Refraining 
from bidding generally is not illegal if a firm unilaterally decides that such a strategy is in its 
own best  
                                                          
23 Figure 1 is taken from the Plantmix Asphalt Industry of Kentucky web site. 
24 There are numerous examples of single-bidder paving companies playing “chicken” with KYTC, having an initial 
bid rejected and the project being put up for rebid. On several occasions there have been three and four rounds of 
rejected bids and rebidding. The usual outcome is that KYTC ultimately blinks when there is no viable alternative 
supplier. Barrus (2011) discusses several examples of such interactions. 
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Figure 1:  Asphalt Plant Locations in Kentucky  
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economic interest.25 The global profit maximum for all players requires that the low-cost firm for 
each project wins the auction. If each player wins often enough to consider the outcome 
equitable, then the only problem is devising a bid rotation scheme in which the low-cost firm is 
always the designated winner. With multiple firms and multiple projects, overt communication 
may be required to reach this outcome.26 When the number of potential bidders is small, 
however, firms may recognize their mutual interest in suppressing competition without direct 
communication.27 The existence of a natural focal point may obviate the need for overt collusion. 
If procurement auctions are configured to create an easy way for firms to allocate contracts and 
refrain from bidding against one another without openly communicating, then tacit collusion 
may accomplish the same outcome as would occur under an illegal cartel.28 
The problem can be modeled as follows: Consider two firms, X and Y, that produce a 
product that is costly to deliver and are located at some distance from each other. They must 
decide whether to bid on a project that is located distances dx from X and dy from Y. Each incurs 
production and transportation costs of Cx and Cy, respectively, if they win the bid and carry out 
the project. There is a random element of ε associated with each firm’s costs, so that neither 
                                                          
25 See Werden’s (2004) discussion of the legal status and treatment of tacit vs. overt collusion, especially pp. 734-
59. Yao and DeSanti (1993) also discuss the legal quandaries of prosecuting tacit collusion. Page (2016) provides an 
in-depth analysis of what constitutes an illegal agreement. 
26 This is precisely the scenario studied by Porter and Zona (1993), whereby highway contractors on Long Island 
devised a bid rotation scheme with designated losers submitting complementary bids. See also Conley and 
Decarolis’s (2016) analysis of bidding cartels in Italy. 
27 As Fraas and Greer (1977, pp. 29-31) point out, the necessity of a formal collusive agreement increases as 
structural conditions become more adverse to tacit cooperation. With two firms selling a standardized product, overt 
collusion may be immanently possible but not really needed. Their empirical analysis of 606 explicit price fixing 
cases from 1910 to 1972 confirms this conjecture. 
28 Green, Marshall, and Marx (2015) argue that most market environments are sufficiently complex that collusion 
will be unsuccessful in the absence of explicit communication. But in a market that is so simple and transparent that 
“there is a unique candidate for the optimal collusive agreement,” i.e., a focal point, then tacit collusion may suffice. 
Lewis (2015) analyzes how pricing focal points facilitate tacit collusion in gasoline retailing. 
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knows its own or its rival’s costs with certainty ex ante. The following diagram illustrates this 
scenario: 
 
Firm X  Project #1      Firm Y 
|__________dx________|____________________dy____________________| 
 
There are three possibilities: (1) dx < dy such that |Cx – Cy| > ε , i.e., firm X is considerably closer 
and so has a clear cost advantage; (2) dx > dy such that |Cx – Cy| > ε , i.e., firm Y is considerably 
closer and so has a clear cost advantage; and (3) dx ≈ dy such that |Cx – Cy| < ε , i.e., firms X and 
Y are roughly equidistant and so neither firm has a clear cost advantage. 
Let us first analyze the case where firm X has a clear cost advantage, i.e., condition (1) 
above holds. Each firm must decide whether to bid and, if so, how much to bid. Firm X will 
clearly participate in the auction, so we focus on firm Y’s participation and pricing decisions. As 
illustrated below, these can be represented as a two-stage sequential-move game, in which the 
first stage represents firm Y’s decision to enter or stay out of the auction. In the second stage, if 
firm Y decides not to enter, then firm X is the only bidder. But if firm Y enters and submits a 
bid, the two firms play a simultaneous-move pricing game:29 
            ●   Firm X bids high and earns monopoly profits, Firm Y earns zero profits 
         / 
       / 
     /   don’t enter 
   / 
 / 
Firm Y ● 
 \ 
   \ 
     \   enter and bid 
       \ 
         \   
            ●   Firms X and Y bid simultaneously:  
                                                          
29 This particular configuration of a multistage entry game comes from Dixit and Skeath (2004), pp. 155-161. 
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                                             Firm Y 
 
Firm X 
 Pc Pm 
Pc πcx ,  -cbid πcx ,  -cbid 
Pm -cbid , πcy πmx ,  -cbid 
 
In the pricing game payoff matrix, we restrict bid options for each firm to bidding competitively 
(Pc) or bidding monopolistically (Pm). Since firm X has a clear cost advantage, it will always win 
if both firms bid competitively.30 Without digressing into a deeper discussion of economic 
profits, let us assume that winning the auction when bidding is noncompetitive yields more profit 
(πm) than winning when bidding is competitive (πc) and that either is better than not winning the 
auction (π = -cbid, where cbid represents the cost of preparing and submitting a bid). 
 The Nash equilibrium to the second-stage pricing game is that both firms bid 
competitively and firm X has the lower bid due to its locational cost advantage. It then earns 
competitive profits on the project while firm Y incurs the cost of submitting a bid and has 
nothing to show for it. In the first stage, looking ahead to the outcome of this pricing game and 
reasoning backward, firm Y will choose not to enter the auction and submit a bid. Because of 
symmetry, if firm Y has a significant locational advantage the outcome would be reversed and 
firm X would choose not to enter and submit a bid. 
 The third possibility is that the project is roughly equidistant from each firm, so that 
neither has a clear cost advantage. If both firms enter the auction and bid, the payoff matrix for 
this game is the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. If the game is played repeatedly and firms are 
unable to cooperate, then each firm will bid competitively, and sometimes firm X will win and 
                                                          
30 Let us assert that firm X also wins if both firms bid noncompetitively, since firm X’s bid will be lower than firm 
Y’s if both use the same relative markup. 
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sometimes firm Y will win. Indeed, this seems to be the outcome for procurement auctions 
conducted in the northern Kentucky and greater Louisville markets where there are multiple 
bidders. On the other hand, if coordination is achieved, either overtly or tacitly, the collusive 
duopoly pricing outcome can be sustained. 
 In actuality, many asphalt paving firms in Kentucky play this game repeatedly against an 
identifiable rival, with KYTC putting projects up for bid in various locations at regular intervals. 
If roughly half the projects let for bids were clearly closer to firm X and the other half were 
clearly closer to firm Y, it would be unsurprising if the two firms used distance as a focal point 
for cooperation and either refrained from bidding or bid noncompetitively, with the more distant 
firm’s noncompetitive bid being higher than the closer firm’s noncompetitive bid.31 
Projects roughly equidistant from both firms create a problem for such coordination, 
however, and so relying solely on distance as a focal point for cooperation may give rise to 
outbreaks of competitive bidding (price wars) or temptations to overtly collude. Fortunately for 
asphalt oligopolists (and unfortunately for Kentucky taxpayers), KYTC refines this focal point 
by assigning asphalt projects strictly according to county boundaries. In adjacent counties where 
there is only one company with an asphalt plant in each county, the natural focal point outcome 
is hard to miss. 
The different possible bidding scenarios can be seen in Figure 2. It illustrates two firms 
(X and Y), four counties (A-D), and four projects (1-4). Project 1 is located in county A where 
firm X has the only asphalt plant. Project 2 is located in adjacent county B where rival firm Y 
                                                          
31 This is precisely the collusive outcome achieved by Oklahoma asphalt companies during the 1960s as described in 
Funderburk (1974). 
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has the only asphalt plant. Project 3 is located in county C where both firms X and Y have 
asphalt plants. Project 4 is located in county D where neither firm X nor Y has an asphalt plant. 
 
Figure 2: County Boundaries and Bid Coordination 
 
Projects 1 and 2 are roughly equidistant from both firm X and firm Y. In a “flat” world, 
each firm would have similar costs of carrying out each of the two projects. With no focal point 
for cooperation, it is not clear how the two firms might reach a noncompetitive bidding 
equilibrium without overt communication. If projects are delineated by county lines, however, 
and each firm has the only asphalt plant in its own county, then the natural focal point for 
cooperation is for firm X to carry out project 1 and firm Y to carry out project 2, both at 
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noncompetitively high bids. By requiring advance purchase of official plans and publicly 
identifying firms that have purchased plans prior to bid submission deadlines, KYTC bidding 
rules make it easy for firms to charge super-competitive prices. Firm Y can signal firm X that it 
does not intend to enter and bid on project 1 by not purchasing an official set of plans, leaving 
firm X as the sole bidder (and vice versa for project 2). 
For projects 3 and 4, there are no natural focal points for cooperation. Project 3 is located 
in county C, where rival firms X and Y both have asphalt plants. Project 3 is roughly equidistant 
from both firms. With no clear focal point to guide the firms’ cooperative instincts, competitive 
bidding is likely to occur absent overt communication between the firms. Project 4 is located in 
county D, which is adjacent to both Counties A and B and has no asphalt plant located within its 
boundaries. Project 4 is also roughly equidistant from the asphalt plants of both X and Y. Again 
there is no clear focal point for cooperation, and without overt collusion the bidding is likely to 
be competitive. 
This suggests a strategy for identifying whether firms use county boundaries as focal 
points for coordinating bids. In a flat world with no political boundaries, firms will consider their 
own costs of carrying out a particular project and size up the likely bids of other potential 
suppliers when formulating their bid. In a thick market where multiple firms have overlapping 
viable service territories, we would expect competitive pricing to prevail, with closer firms 
exploiting any slight cost advantage and submitting lower bids. In a thin market where perhaps 
only two firms can viably serve a proposed project, whether to participate and how much to bid 
will also be affected by distance—distance from own plant to the project and distance advantage 
(or disadvantage) relative to the rival. Distance variables are thus predicted to significantly affect 
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both the participation decision and the pricing decision in thick markets and in thin markets, and 
arbitrary lines on a map should have no explanatory power. 32 
If, on the other hand, firms in thin markets bid repeatedly against one another in the same 
geographic space, coordination may arise. As discussed earlier, coordination on projects where 
one or the other firm has a clear distance-based cost advantage is easy—the more distant firm 
opts not to enter and bid, and the nearer firm as the only bidder is able to set a monopoly price. 
But when neither firm has a clear cost advantage, coordination becomes a challenge. It is in this 
setting that county boundaries may serve as a focal point, with each firm bidding within the 
county where its plant is located. If such bid coordination is occurring, then inclusion of 
variables identifying county type as in Figure 2 will have explanatory power above and beyond 
the distance measures. 
 
Data 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to see if firms are coordinating bids. The data used are 
publicly available and were obtained from the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet for the years 
2005–07. Information on contracts awarded, which firms purchased bid proposals, which firms 
actually bid on each project, the amount of each bid, the winning firm, and the engineer’s 
estimate were obtained from the KYTC Construction Procurement website. These detailed data 
                                                          
32 It is reasonable to ask whether county borders are arbitrary lines on a map or instead proxy for unmeasured 
aspects of the geography that might keep potential bidders out. In a larger state with fewer counties, this concern 
might be more worrisome. For historical reasons (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_counties_in_Kentucky), 
Kentucky has more counties (120) than all other states except Georgia (159) and Texas (254). The average area of 
counties in Kentucky (329 square miles) is smaller than all other states except Virginia (295 square miles) and 
Rhode Island (207 square miles). Many of the projects that attract only a single bidder actually consist of a stretch of 
road that passes through two counties and is split into two separate projects for bid-letting purposes, with the split 
occurring at the county line. Finally, the mapping algorithm for viable service territories utilizes primary and 
secondary roads that are minimally rated to handle dual rear-axle dump trucks. 
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were only available after 2005 on the KYTC website. Upon request, the Kentucky 
Transportation Cabinet supplied project location (latitude and longitude for the mid-point of each 
project) information for the projects in Kentucky from 1996–2009. These data also included 
information on the type of work, including a short description of what the project entailed along 
with information about the road, location, and number of bids. This was supplemented with 
another KYTC data set that contained all awarded contracts in Kentucky from 1994–2010. 
Information about plant locations came from various sources, including the Plantmix 
Asphalt Industry of Kentucky (PAIKY) website, the Division of Materials within the 
Transportation Cabinet, air quality permits obtained from the Division of Air Quality within the 
Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet, and individual firm websites. For a few firms, the 
locations of the asphalt plants were confirmed by telephone. A total of 1,985 projects were let 
and awarded from 2005 to 2007. We identified asphalt projects using the KYTC label for each 
project that briefly summarized the scope of the project. In order to qualify as an asphalt project, 
the job could not have any other element except asphalt surfacing, resurfacing, rehabilitation, or 
patching. Asphalt projects that had grade and drain, bridge, or guardrail components were not 
included in the “asphalt” projects for this analysis, leaving us with 1,060 projects for analysis.33 
These projects accounted for around $600 million in expenditures by the Kentucky 
Transportation Cabinet. 
 
                                                          
33 Projects with construction components attract a different (and partially overlapping) set of bidders, because the 
geographic scope of the market for these sorts of projects can be considerably larger than simple asphalt projects. 
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Firms and Counties 
During the sample period 31 major firms bid on asphalt paving projects in Kentucky.34 The 31 
Kentucky firms have a total of 113 asphalt plants in the 120 Kentucky counties for an average of 
0.94 plants per county. Figure 1 illustrates the location of each asphalt plant in Kentucky. Table 
2 contains the names of the 31 firms, the number of asphalt plants each firm operates, the 
number of asphalt projects they bid on in Kentucky, the percentage of bids in which the firm was 
the single bidder, the number of contracts the firm won, and the value of the contracted projects. 
Considerable variation exists across firms. In the far western corner of Kentucky, H&G 
Construction bid on 77 projects even though it only has one asphalt plant. It only won 14 of 
those projects; it was never the only bidder, always facing competition from Jim Smith 
Contracting and Murray Paving. Two central Kentucky firms, ATS Construction and Nally & 
Gibson Georgetown, were sole bidders 100 percent of the time and hence won all of the projects 
they bid on. 
 
 
                                                          
34 There were three additional Kentucky firms that showed up once or twice in the bid data, and four Indiana paving 
companies that were approved for state contract work and bid into Kentucky. One of the Indiana firms, Gohman 
Asphalt, is a frequent bidder in the Louisville market. We include the Kentucky bids of these out-of-state firms in 
our empirical analysis. 
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Table 2. Firm bidding and the value of winning contracts for asphalt paving companies in 
Kentucky 
 
 
Service Areas 
Political boundaries such as county boundaries and highway district boundaries do not 
necessarily align with geographic economic markets. In asphalt paving, the feasible service 
territory is the area where a firm can economically service any asphalt project (i.e. where the 
firm can reasonably complete an asphalt paving job without the hot-mix asphalt cooling below 
the temperature threshold). When looking at the distance from a firm’s plants to projects it bid 
on, there were no instances in the entire sample in which a firm bid on a project more than 60 
Firms
Number of 
Plants
Number of 
Bids
Firm only bidder 
on project (%)
Number of 
Project Won
Contracted Value of 
Winning Projects ($)
THE ALLEN COMPANY INC   3 54 50 49 15,308,473.15             
ATS CONSTRUCTION 2 21 100 21 39,934,777.30             
BARRETT PAVING MATERIALS INC 3 63 0 16 4,376,192.58               
BLACKTOP INDUSTRIES & EQUIPMENT COMPANY 1 11 0 2 528,974.50                  
BLUEGRASS CONTRACTING CORPORATION 1 31 0 8 2,227,065.31               
COMMERCIAL PAVERS INC 3 44 0 24 18,353,377.60             
EATON ASPHALT PAVING CO INC 5 99 3 43 12,210,883.50             
ELMO GREER & SONS LLC 10 69 55 66 34,306,098.30             
FLYNN BROTHERS CONTRACTING INC 2 28 0 6 2,987,221.00               
GADDIE-SHAMROCK LLC 3 28 82 28 26,117,688.71             
GLASS PAVING INC 2 20 70 16 10,558,645.85             
H & G CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INC 1 77 0 14 6,106,025.76               
H G MAYS CORPORATION 3 38 45 32 16,388,222.00             
HINKLE CONTRACTING CORPORATION 11 107 92 103 51,571,836.47             
JIM SMITH CONTRACTING COMPANY LLC 3 86 14 72 29,068,199.65             
KAY & KAY CONTRACTING LLC 1 33 0 3 719,879.00                  
LEXINGTON QUARRY COMPANY 1 17 76 14 7,117,499.10               
LINCOLN COUNTY READY MIX INC & 1 28 0 5 2,226,384.48               
MAGO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LLC 12 101 47 88 38,670,973.43             
MOUNTAIN ENTERPRISES INC 13 150 87 144 77,543,544.78             
MURRAY PAVING 1 4 25 4 1,765,535.60               
NALLY & GIBSON GEORGETOWN LLC D/B/A 1 11 100 11 4,804,703.60               
NALLY & HAYDON SURFACING LLC 3 30 97 30 12,967,285.12             
OHIO VALLEY ASPHALT LLC 3 33 39 27 7,344,865.32               
QUALIFIED PAVING LLC 1 17 0 10 7,281,674.44               
ROAD BUILDERS & PARKWAY CONSTRUCTION LLC 2 38 76 33 24,192,496.38             
ROGERS GROUP INC 5 53 74 50 37,252,115.20             
SCOTTY'S CONTRACTING AND STONE LLC 12 118 61 96 69,271,902.25             
SHELBYVILLE ASPHALT COMPANY LLC 1 6 17 3 692,378.10                  
THE WALKER COMPANY OF KENTUCKY INC   2 22 86 21 7,110,045.55               
YAGER MATERIALS LLC 1 28 68 21 24,133,747.90             
Asphalt Paving Projects Bid on Asphalt Paving Contracts Won
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miles from its plant. The service area limit for every firm was thus set at 60 driving miles from 
each firm’s asphalt plant.35 
All mapping analysis was done in the ArcGIS ArcMap program using the Network 
Analyst function. We were able to determine and calculate the service areas and driving 
distances from asphalt plant to project. The software also mapped out these 60-mile service 
areas. As an example, Figure 3 shows H&G Construction’s service area in western Kentucky and 
the projects on which it either did or did not bid in its service area. The different 10-mile bands 
indicate distance from H&G’s asphalt plant in Graves County. Visual inspection indicates the 
apparent importance of distance in the firm’s bid decisions. In Livingston County, H&G bid on a 
project almost 60 miles away from its plant. 
 
 
                                                          
35 We also tried 50-mile and 40-mile specifications of each firm’s service area in the empirical work, with only very 
minor effects on coefficient magnitudes and significance. 
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Figure 3: Service area – H&G Construction in Western Kentucky 
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Analyzing Bidding Behavior and Identifying Tacit Collusion 
Our goal is to investigate whether firms use county boundaries as focal points for tacit collusion. 
To accomplish that, we analyze both the participation decision and the pricing decision for the 31 
firms bidding on asphalt projects in Kentucky. Previous authors (e.g., De Silva, Jeitschko, and 
Kosmopoulou, 2009) who have examined bidding in highway procurement auctions have 
combined all the data into one market bidding regression. This approach makes sense if each 
firm faces similar market conditions in a fairly thick bidding market. As we have argued, 
however, some parts of the state have market characteristics that are conducive to competitive 
bidding, whereas the rest of the state might be susceptible to collusive bidding. The Louisville 
and northern Kentucky market areas have dense public road networks, considerable private 
commercial paving work, and numerous asphalt paving companies. Other regions of Kentucky 
have fewer paving companies, largely because of sparser road networks and fewer private paving 
jobs. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Since we are trying to test for a specific form of collusive behavior, we estimate reduced form 
participation and pricing regressions, first for the entire sample of firms, and then separately for 
firms bidding in Louisville and northern Kentucky and for firms bidding in the rest of the state. 
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis, including 
measures of pricing, distance, jobs under contract, potential competitors, number of bidders, 
number of bid proposals purchased, and county identifier variables. There were 1,465 bids 
submitted on KYTC asphalt projects during the sample period, 270 of which were submitted in 
the Louisville and northern Kentucky regions and 1,195 of which were submitted in the rest of  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for All Counties, Competitive Counties, and Non-competitive 
Counties 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All 
Counties 
(n=1,465) 
Competitive 
Counties 
(n=270) 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
(n=1,195) 
Pricing (Bid Value/Engineer’s Est.) 0.957 0.883 0.974 
 (0.120) (0.0941) (0.119) 
Distance (0 to 10 miles) 0.324 0.448 0.295 
 (0.468) (0.498) (0.456) 
Distance (11 to 20 miles) 0.375 0.404 0.369 
 (0.484) (0.492) (0.483) 
Distance (21 to 30 miles) 0.205 0.119 0.225 
 (0.404) (0.324) (0.418) 
Distance (31 to 40 miles) 0.0696 0.0296 0.0787 
 (0.255) (0.17) (0.269) 
Distance (41 to 50 miles) 0.0239 - 0.0293 
 (0.153) - (0.169) 
Distance (51 to 60 miles) 0.00205 - 0.00251 
 (0.0452) - (0.0501) 
Jobs Under Contract 5.214 2.426 5.844 
 (4.261) (2.716) (4.295) 
Potential Competitors 6.550 7.67 6.297 
 (3.367) (2.326) (3.512) 
Number of Bidders 1.756 2.826 1.514 
 (0.853) (0.811) (0.653) 
One Bidder 0.462 0.0444 0.556 
 (0.499) (0.206) (0.497) 
Two Bidders 0.369 0.27 0.391 
 (0.483) (0.445) (0.488) 
Three Bidders 0.126 0.526 0.0351 
 (0.332) (0.5) (0.184) 
Four Bidders 0.0389 0.133 0.0176 
 (0.193) (0.341) (0.131) 
Five Bidders 0.00478 0.0259 - 
 (0.0690) (0.159) - 
One Bid Proposal Purchased 0.403 0.0222 0.49 
 (0.491) (0.148) (0.5) 
Two Bid Proposal Purchased 0.371 0.215 0.406 
 (0.483) (0.411) (0.491) 
Three Bid Proposal Purchased 0.154 0.496 0.077 
 (0.361) (0.501) (0.267) 
Four Bid Proposal Purchased 0.0491 0.193 0.0167 
 (0.216) (0.395) (0.128) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All 
Counties 
(n=1,465) 
Competitive 
Counties 
(n=270) 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
(n=1,195) 
Five Bid Proposal Purchased 0.0171 0.0667 0.00586 
 (0.130) (0.25) (0.0763) 
Six Bid Proposal Purchased 0.00546 0.00741 0.00502 
 (0.0737) (0.0859) (0.0707) 
Project in same county-no rival 0.438 0.219 0.488 
 (0.496) (0.414) (0.5) 
Project in same county-rival 0.140 0.374 0.087 
 (0.347) (0.485) (0.282) 
Project in adjacent county-no rival 0.297 0.185 0.322 
 (0.457) (0.389) (0.468) 
Project in adjacent county-rival 0.125 0.222 0.103 
 (0.331) (0.417) (0.304) 
 
the state. Column (1) contains all bids; column (2) contains bids submitted for projects in the 
competitive market areas surrounding Louisville and northern Kentucky; and column (3) 
contains bids submitted in the rest of the state.  
Significant differences between the competitive and noncompetitive regions are 
immediately evident. The ratio of the bid price to the state engineer’s official estimate of the 
project cost averaged 88 percent in Louisville and northern Kentucky, versus 97 percent in the 
rest of the state. The average number of bidders on projects in Louisville and northern Kentucky 
was 2.8, versus 1.5 for the rest of the state. Four percent of projects attracted only a single bidder 
in competitive regions, whereas 56 percent of projects had only one bidder in noncompetitive 
regions. Eighty-five percent of bids were on projects located within 20 miles of the plant in 
competitive regions, while 66 percent of bids were within a 20-mile radius in noncompetitive 
regions. Finally, only 22 percent of projects were located in a county with only one asphalt plant 
Table 3 (continued) 
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in the Louisville and northern Kentucky markets, while 49 percent of projects were in single-
plant counties in the rest of the state. 
 
Whether to Bid—the Participation Decision 
All of the projects in each firm’s potential service area are included in the analysis of bidding 
behavior. Each individual project located in a firm’s service area is a unit of observation. The 
dependent variable is the behavior we are trying to understand—whether a firm bids on a project 
that it can feasibly carry out. Expected profits are the obvious starting point, so we analyze 
factors that are likely to affect the expected profitability of a project. These include cost factors 
such as distance from plant to project, the number of projects a firm has under contract, and the 
size of the project. Since firms are competing in a repeated game, strategic factors such as how 
many firms purchased bid proposals and how many other firms also have the project in their 
service territories and hence could potentially carry out the project are also included. In a 
separate specification, county variables are added to see if county boundaries have explanatory 
power apart from distance, which would be consistent with county boundaries serving as focal 
points for firms to coordinate their bidding. 
Distance is a major determinant of costs in asphalt paving, and so we would expect the 
distance variable to be highly important in the firm’s bidding decision.36 After determining 
projects falling within the firm’s service area, we calculated the driving distance from the plant 
to the project using the OD Cost Matrix function in ArcMap. This mapping function calculates 
the shortest driving distance from a plant to each project in the service area using maps publicly 
available from the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet. 
                                                          
36 See, for example, Bajari and Ye (2003) and De Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou (2003). 
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Capacity utilization may affect a firm’s decision to bid on a project. If a firm is at or close 
to capacity, the cost of taking on additional work will be increased.37 We construct this variable 
by determining the number of projects the firm is currently working on (falling between the 
beginning and ending date) on the day of bidding. For example, Mountain Enterprises bid on a 
project on November 11, 2007. A search of the awarded contract data indicates that the firm had 
seven projects under contract on that day. This exercise was replicated for each project for each 
firm. 
Heterogeneity between projects is captured using the state engineer’s estimate of the cost 
of the job. This variable serves as an indicator of the scale of the job.38 It also lends insight into 
the types of projects firms are willing to bid on. In thicker markets some firms target large-scale 
high-value projects while others concentrate on smaller projects. In thinner markets firms tend to 
bid on all jobs put out for bid by KYTC. 
Two other variables capture competitive and strategic effects. The first measures the 
number of rival firms that purchased official bid proposals for the project. We include this 
variable to see if knowledge that other firms have expressed an interest in bidding on the project 
reduces or increases the probability of bidding. This variable captures a strategic element of 
bidding that may result when firms know in advance which of their rivals (if any) will participate 
in the auction. The second variable counts the number of other competitors whose 60-mile 
service areas contain the specific project. This variable captures a somewhat different strategic 
                                                          
37 See, for example, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and De Silva, Kosmopoulou, and Lamarche (2009). In an 
interview, KYTC officials expressed that they do not see capacity constraints as an issue, since they schedule 
projects specifically not to create capacity problems for likely bidders. 
38 See, for example, De Silva, Jeitschko, and Kosmopoulou (2009). 
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effect—the number of potential competitors the firm faces in its long-run supply of asphalt in a 
geographic market.  
 Initially a probit model was used, following De Silva, Jeitschko, and Kosmopoulou 
(2009). Problems with that approach arise, however, because there are a number of firms that 
tend to bid only in their specific counties.39 Linear probability models are a possible alternative, 
because they provide a linear approximation to whatever underlying model is present and allow 
the fixed effects to stay in the model regardless of the pattern of bidding. While the linear 
probability model is controversial because of its range (fitted values outside 0, 1), there is a 
tradeoff between this problem and those discussed in the previous footnote. Theoretically, the 
fixed effects in a probit model apply to the propensity score. If the firm does not bid at all in a 
county the propensity score, which is abstract and unobserved, is negative infinity. That makes 
no sense—surely there is some nonzero probability of bidding—but the probit model requires 
this result. The linear probability model only calculates that the probability of bidding is low, 
which is more realistic. For this reason we present results using linear probability models to 
estimate the bidding participation decision.40 
The sample includes any asphalt project put out for bid from 2005 to 2007 within each 
firm’s 60-mile service area, aggregated over all 31 firms in the state. The dependent variable (y = 
                                                          
39 The probits we ran with fixed effects of counties are subject to two problems, both of which potentially bias the 
results in important ways. First, the fixed effects are estimated on small samples, and they cannot be differenced out 
in a non-linear model like probit. The fact that fixed effects are inconsistent creates bias for the whole model. The 
inconsistency arises from the lack of variance going to zero, as the county sample does not grow. Second, perfect 
classification, in which a firm either always or never bids in a county, eliminates the county variables and the 
software drops these variables out of the model. Some firms are affected a lot by this, others very little. This creates, 
in effect, a selection bias because firms are not bidding in some counties, which then drop out of the sample rather 
than staying in with some sort of coefficient. Neither of these problems can be eliminated if probit, logit, or any 
other non-linear model is used. They constitute unfortunate but unavoidable problems in combining limited 
dependent variables and fixed effects. 
40 J. S. Butler and Chris Bollinger added invaluable insights into reasons why the linear probability model is the 
preferred approach for this particular analysis. 
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1 if the firm bids, y = 0 otherwise) is whether the firm bids on a specific project. The first 
independent variable consists of 10-mile categorical dummy variables for distance (Distance).41 
The reference category is the distance ring 0–10 miles. The next variable is Jobs Under 
Contract, which controls for the number of projects a firm has currently under contract from 
KYTC when it bids on a project. The Engineer’s Estimate is included to control for costs and 
size of the projects and other heterogeneity associated with each project. Potential Competitors 
indicates how many other firms have the project within their 60-mile service area and could 
feasibly bid on the project as well. The Bid Proposal variable consists of a set of categorical 
dummy variables indicating how many other firms have purchased bid proposals for that 
particular project. Equation (A) expresses this first specification of the bid participation 
regression: 




Proposals) (Bids)Competitor (Potential
Estimate) s(Engineer'Contract) Under (Jobs(Distance)
54
3210y
 
 In a market environment with geographically dispersed asphalt firms, geographically 
dispersed paving projects, and no political boundaries defining the location of projects and firms, 
we would expect the cost variables, especially distance, to be significant determinants of bidding 
behavior. We would expect the competitive/strategic variables to play a bigger role in thinner 
markets than in thicker markets. In such an environment with no obvious focal point, it would be 
difficult for firms to coordinate their bidding absent overt communication. 
 In a market environment where firms and projects are defined by their location inside or 
outside certain political boundaries, such as county lines in Kentucky, firms may be able to 
                                                          
41 We also estimated bid functions using distance and distance squared. These results were similar to the results with 
the categorical variables. 
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coordinate their bidding, especially when only a few are involved. In that case, location relative 
to political boundaries would take on greater importance in predicting bidding behavior, and 
actual distance from plant to project may take on lesser importance. To test for the importance of 
these political boundary-location effects, we expand the specification of the bid participation 
regression as follows: 




All):(CountyProposals) (Bids)Competitor (Potential
Estimate) s(Engineer'Contract) Under (Jobs(Distance)
654
3210y
 
The County: All variable is a set of dummy variables that captures the four scenarios 
depicted in Figure 2. Project in same county-no rival (depicted as county A in Figure 2) is the 
reference category and is excluded from the regression. This variable indicates that a project is 
located in a county where the firm has an asphalt plant, and where no rival firms have an asphalt 
plant. Project in same county-rival (depicted as county C in Figure 2) indicates a project that is 
in the same county, and a rival firm also has an asphalt plant in that county. Project in adjacent 
county-rival (depicted as county B in Figure 2) indicates a project that is in an adjacent county, 
and a rival firm has an asphalt plant in the county. Project in adjacent county-no rival (depicted 
as county D in Figure 2) indicates that a project is in an adjacent county that does not have an 
asphalt plant in the county. 
If in a thin market firms are able to use county boundaries to coordinate bids, these 
variables will allow us to identify such behavior. If firms X and Y in counties A and B in Figure 
2 are able to coordinate their participation decisions by only bidding within their own county and 
refraining from bidding in their rival’s county, then the Project in adjacent county-rival variable 
will be negative and significant, all else constant. This result would mean that, even after 
controlling for distance and other factors, a firm is less likely to bid on a project simply because 
(B) 
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it is in a county where a rival has an asphalt plant. This result would therefore support a 
conclusion that firms are tacitly colluding in bidding and “respecting” one another’s turf. 
 
How Much to Bid—the Pricing Decision 
Once a firm decides to participate in a particular auction, it must formulate a bid. All of the bids 
submitted on all projects during the sample period are included in our analysis of pricing 
behavior. Each individual bid is a unit of observation. The dependent variable is the behavior we 
are trying to understand—how much a firm chooses to bid on a project that it can feasibly carry 
out. So that we can compare across projects of different magnitudes, we express the firm’s bid as 
a proportion of the state highway engineer’s official estimate of the cost of completing the 
project.  
In explaining how much firms choose to bid, expected profits again are the obvious 
starting point, so we analyze factors that are likely to affect the expected profitability of winning 
the bid and carrying out the project. These include cost factors such as distance from plant to 
project, the number of projects a firm has under contract, and the size of the project. Since firms 
are competing in a repeated game, strategic factors such as how many rival firms also have the 
project in their service areas are also included.  
Instead of bid proposals purchased, we use the number of bidders to capture actual 
competition. Firms know in advance of submitting their bid the number and identity of any other 
firms that have purchased a bid proposal. In competitive auctions, multiple plans are purchased 
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and firms fully expect to face rival bidders. In less-competitive markets in Kentucky, roughly 
half the time firms know they will be the only bidder in advance of turning in their bid.42  
Another strategic element in the pricing decision is the magnitude of the cost advantage 
or disadvantage due to distance, which is most likely to come into play in thin markets where 
firms have identifiable rivals whose costs they can easily estimate. Accordingly, we include a 
variable measuring the difference in distance to the project between the bidder’s plant and the 
next closest rival plant.43 Lastly, county identifier variables are added to see if firms bid 
differently when on home turf, a rival firm’s turf, or unclaimed territory. 
 
Empirical Results 
We first construct some simple cross tabulations to determine whether any bid coordination via 
refraining from bidding seems to occur. When counties are classified according to type as in 
Figure 2, the number and percent of projects that attract only one, two, three, four, or five bidders 
is as follows: 
Number of projects classified by number of bidders and county types 
 
 Number of Bidders 
County Type 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
A/B 494 
(74.5% 
137 
(20.7% 
28 
(4.2%) 
3 
(0.5%) 
1 
(0.2% 
663 
(100%) 
C 28 
(25.0%) 
46 
(41.1%) 
20 
(17.9%) 
16 
(14.3%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
112 
D 155 
(54.4%) 
101 
(35.4%) 
24 
(8.4%) 
5 
(1.8%) 
0 285 
Total 677 284 72 24 3 1060 
                                                          
42 In the rare instance when a firm is uncertain whether a rival is actually going to follow up its purchase of a bid 
proposal by actually submitting a bid, the incumbent can easily carry two bid envelopes to the bid closing and see 
whether its rival shows up and turns in a bid. We also estimated the pricing equations using the number of bid 
proposals purchased, with no significant effect on the regression results. 
43 This distance differential is positive (negative) if the rival plant is farther away from (closer to) the project. 
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As is evident, projects located in counties where only one asphalt company has a plant (types A 
and B) are relatively more likely to attract only one bidder than projects located in counties 
where multiple companies have plants (type C) or no companies have plants (type D). 
 A finer distinction can be drawn by focusing on projects where there are only two firms 
in close proximity. We restrict our attention to projects where there are only two firms with an 
asphalt plant located within 30 miles and where the distance differential between the two plants 
is less than 10 miles. To determine whether bid coordination via county boundaries is occurring, 
we also categorize projects according to county type. In type A/B counties, firm X owns the 
plant in the county and firm Y owns the plant in an adjacent county. In type C and type D 
counties, firm X has the nearer plant: 
Number of Projects Firms X and Y Bid On by County Type 
 
County Type  Firm X Firm Y Total Number 
 of Projects 
A/B  65 
(98.5%) 
14 
(21.2%) 
66 
 
C  25 
(65.8%) 
33 
(86.8%) 
38 
D  58 
(89.2%) 
34 
(52.3%) 
63 
 
Again, county boundaries seem to drive bidding decisions. When neither firm has a sizeable 
distance advantage but the project is located in the same county as one firm’s plant but not the 
other’s, the outsider (firm Y) avoids encroaching on the insider’s (firm X) turf. On the other 
hand, when both firms are insiders (county type C) or both firms are outsiders (county type D), 
there is no clear focal point delineating each firm’s turf and both firms are very likely to bid. 
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Whether to Bid—the Participation Decision 
While these simple cross tabulations are informative, other factors affect firms’ bid participation 
decisions. Table 4 contains the results of the participation decision regressions. The first two 
columns contain results for all counties; the third and fourth columns contain results for the 
thicker market areas around Louisville and northern Kentucky; and the fifth and sixth columns 
contain results for potentially less competitive counties in the rest of the state. In each case we 
include specifications first without, and then with, county identifier dummies.  
The first column represents the most general specification—all firms in all counties, with 
no county identifier dummies—and turns up statistically significant regression coefficients with 
the expected signs. Distance is highly significant—firms are increasingly less likely to bid as 
distance from the project to the firm’s asphalt plant increases from zero to 30 miles. The distance 
effect tapers off after 30 miles, reflecting that very few firms bid on projects that far from their 
plant. Having more jobs currently under contract reduces the likelihood of bidding. Larger jobs 
attract fewer bidders. More potential competitors reduce the likelihood that a firm submits a bid. 
Finally, when the firm knows in advance that other firms have purchased bid plans, the 
likelihood of bidding drops significantly. 
The second column regression uses the same sample as the first—competitive and 
Noncompetitive counties together—but adds county identifier dummies. Results for other 
variables are generally similar, except that the inclusion of county identifier dummies reduces the 
coefficient magnitudes for the distance buckets. Coefficients on the county variables indicate that 
there is essentially no difference in the likelihood of bidding on projects located in the county 
where the firm’s asphalt plant is located, whether or not another firm has a plant in that same 
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county. The likelihood of bidding in an adjacent county is reduced even if there is no rival plant 
in that county, and is further reduced if another firm has a plant located in that county. 
 Market conditions in Louisville and northern Kentucky differ from the rest of the state, as 
indicated by comparisons of basic summary statistics in Table 3. Results for bidding 
participation regressions in these competitive markets are contained in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 4. Distance is a significant determinant of the likelihood of bidding. Jobs under contract, 
the engineer’s estimate of the cost of the job, and the number of potential competitors are not 
statistically significant factors. When county identifier variables are added, the presence of 
another likely bidder, as indicated by one other bid proposal being purchased, does not deter 
bidding. Firms are more likely to bid in their own county than in an adjacent county, whether or 
not a rival firm has an asphalt plant in the same county or in the adjacent county. 
 Regression results for noncompetitive counties where market conditions are more 
conducive to collusion are contained in columns (5) and (6). Distance is still a statistically 
significant determinant of the likelihood of bidding, but the magnitudes of the regression 
coefficients are roughly half the size of those for Louisville and northern Kentucky displayed in 
columns (3) and (4). The presence of even one likely other bidder, as indicated by bid proposals 
purchased, greatly reduces the likelihood that a firm submits a bid. The county identifier 
variables suggest the following pattern of bidding behavior in less competitive markets: (a) bid if 
the project is in the same county as your plant, regardless of whether there is a rival plant in the 
county; (b) maybe bid if the project is in an adjacent county with no rival firms; and (c) avoid 
bidding if the project is in an adjacent county where a rival firm has a plant. 
 These results suggest that county boundaries do influence firms’ bid participation 
decisions, more so in thinner markets where firms’ service areas only partially overlap than in 
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thicker markets with multiple bidders. Controlling for distance, a firm is much more likely to bid 
on a project if it is located in its home county than it is to bid if the project is located in an 
adjacent county where a rival firm has a plant. 
 
How Much to Bid—the Pricing Decision 
Table 5 contains results of the reduced form pricing regressions, first for all counties and then for 
competitive counties and noncompetitive counties. Specifications without and with county 
identifier dummy variables are included. The dependent variable is expressed as the ratio of the 
firm’s bid to the engineer’s estimate of the cost of the project. We use the actual number of 
bidders instead of bid proposals purchased in the pricing regressions, and we also include a 
variable measuring the distance differential between the firm and the (next) closest rival to the 
project.44 
 The distance buckets generally are not statistically significant; however, the distance 
differential variable is negative and highly significant. Controlling for other factors, when a firm 
has a 10-mile distance advantage over its next closest rival, it bids roughly 2 percent higher than 
when there is no cost advantage due to greater proximity. The number of firms whose service 
territories include the project (potential competitors) does reduce the bid price submitted, but 
while statistically significant, the economic importance is small. These results do not differ 
between competitive and noncompetitive counties. With the number of bidders and the county 
identifier variables, however, stark differences occur between the competitive and 
noncompetitive regions of the state. 
 
                                                          
44 Results are essentially unchanged if we use bid proposals purchased rather than number of bidders. 
42 
 
Table 4: Participation Regressions (Whether to Bid) for All Counties, Competitive Counties, and Non-competitive Counties 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: 
Bid or Not on Project 
(Bid = 1) 
All Counties 
 
All Counties 
w/County 
Dummies 
Competitive 
Counties 
 
Competitive 
Counties 
w/County Dummies 
Non-
competitive 
Counties 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
w/County Dummies 
Distance (11 to 20 miles) -0.208*** -0.0930*** -0.374*** -0.215*** -0.133*** -0.0380* 
(0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0405) (0.0396) (0.0212) (0.0196) 
Distance (21 to 30 miles) -0.443*** -0.222*** -0.677*** -0.354*** -0.334*** -0.146*** 
(0.0197) (0.0227) (0.0390) (0.0497) (0.0230) (0.0234) 
Distance (31 to 40 miles) -0.590*** -0.353*** -0.804*** -0.461*** -0.479*** -0.274*** 
(0.0186) (0.0223) (0.0335) (0.0472) (0.0227) (0.0234) 
Distance (41 to 50 miles) -0.640*** -0.402*** -0.849*** -0.523*** -0.525*** -0.318*** 
(0.0178) (0.0218) (0.0287) (0.0428) (0.0222) (0.0229) 
Distance (51 to 60 miles) -0.656*** -0.416*** -0.866*** -0.531*** -0.544*** -0.336*** 
(0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0275) (0.0427) (0.0219) (0.0227) 
Jobs Under Contract -0.00187** -0.00127* -0.00398 0.000154 -0.000648 -0.000373 
(0.000765) (0.000703) (0.00248) (0.00223) (0.000789) (0.000734) 
Engineer’s Estimate -5.58e-09*** -3.90e-09** -1.61e-08 -1.16e-08 -4.93e-09** -2.83e-09* 
(1.93e-09) (1.58e-09) (1.26e-08) (1.26e-08) (1.96e-09) (1.59e-09) 
Potential Competitors -0.0193*** -0.0136*** -0.00665* -0.00306 -0.0194*** -0.0141*** 
(0.000952) (0.000912) (0.00388) (0.00376) (0.000977) (0.000938) 
One competitive bid 
proposal purchased 
-0.464*** -0.353*** -0.279*** -0.0173 -0.520*** -0.403*** 
(0.0141) (0.0171) (0.0638) (0.0475) (0.0159) (0.0184) 
Two competitive bid 
proposals purchased 
-0.478*** -0.383*** -0.403*** -0.109** -0.558*** -0.463*** 
(0.0148) (0.0180) (0.0610) (0.0509) (0.0167) (0.0191) 
Three or more competitive 
bid proposals purchased 
-0.503*** -0.386*** -0.540*** -0.243*** -0.515*** -0.407*** 
(0.0159) (0.0187) (0.0616) (0.0517) (0.0216) (0.0231) 
Project in same county-
rival 
 0.0751**  -0.0504  0.0529 
 (0.0295)  (0.0465)  (0.0394) 
Project in adjacent county-
no rival 
 -0.232***  -0.315***  -0.218*** 
 (0.0213)  (0.0494)  (0.0221) 
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: 
Bid or Not on Project 
(Bid = 1) 
All Counties 
 
All Counties 
w/County 
Dummies 
Competitive 
Counties 
 
Competitive 
Counties 
w/County Dummies 
Non-
competitive 
Counties 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
w/County Dummies 
Project in adjacent county-
rival 
 -0.356***  -0.486***  -0.344*** 
 (0.0214)  (0.0458)  (0.0221) 
Constant 1.312*** 1.234*** 1.415*** 1.215*** 1.252*** 1.191*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0733) (0.0612) (0.0158) (0.0146) 
Observations 6,933 6,933 1,009 1,009 5,924 5,924 
R-squared 0.574 0.620 0.575 0.641 0.595 0.635 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Reference Category (distance variables): Distance (0 to 10 miles); Reference Category (Bid props): 0 competitive 
bid proposals purchased; Reference Category (counties): Project in same county-no rival; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5: Pricing Regressions—Bid Price as a Proportion of Engineer’s Estimate of Cost for All Counties, Competitive 
Counties, and Non-competitive Counties 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable:  
Bid Value/Engineer’s 
Est. 
All Counties 
 
All Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Competitive 
Counties 
 
Competitive 
Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Non-
competitive 
Counties 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Distance 
(11 to 20 miles) 
0.00272 0.00147 0.0299** 0.0317** -0.00394 -0.00541 
(0.00583) (0.00589) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.00657) (0.00673) 
Distance 
(21 to 30 miles) 
0.0143* 0.0101 0.0208 0.0268 0.0125 0.00663 
(0.00751) (0.00811) (0.0214) (0.0276) (0.00816) (0.00881) 
Distance 
(31 to 40 miles) 
0.0270** 0.0204 -0.0172 -0.0118 0.0304** 0.0193 
(0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0276) (0.0332) (0.0126) (0.0141) 
Distance 
(41 to 50 miles) 
0.0464* 0.0421*   0.0419* 0.0339 
(0.0248) (0.0252)   (0.0251) (0.0255) 
Table 4 (continued) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable:  
Bid Value/Engineer’s 
Est. 
All Counties 
 
All Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Competitive 
Counties 
 
Competitive 
Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Non-
competitive 
Counties 
Non-competitive 
Counties 
w/ County 
Dummies 
Distance 
(51 to 60 miles) 
0.140 0.130   0.133 0.114 
(0.0999) (0.0993)   (0.101) (0.0999) 
Jobs Under Contract -0.00352*** -0.00351*** -0.00804*** -0.00770*** -0.00293*** -0.00269*** 
(0.000670) (0.000675) (0.00192) (0.00196) (0.000723) (0.000725) 
Potential Competitors -0.00704*** -0.00734*** -0.00700** -0.00575* -0.00627*** -0.00646*** 
(0.000823) (0.000842) (0.00275) (0.00308) (0.000874) (0.000886) 
One bidder 
(ref: 3 or more bidders) 
0.154*** 0.147*** 0.0955*** 0.0934*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 
(0.00691) (0.00791) (0.0324) (0.0352) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
Two bidders 
(ref: 3 or more bidders) 
0.0195** 0.0160** -0.00216 -0.00136 0.0375*** 0.0371*** 
(0.00762) (0.00777) (0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0131) (0.0133) 
Project in same county-
rival 
 -0.0216**  0.00389  -0.0364*** 
 (0.00899)  (0.0194)  (0.0116) 
Project in adjacent 
county-no rival 
 -0.00704  0.0175  -0.00711 
 (0.00680)  (0.0219)  (0.00738) 
Project in adjacent 
county-rival 
 0.0123  -0.00483  0.0340** 
 (0.0123)  (0.0257)  (0.0154) 
Distance difference 
between firm and rivals 
0.00255*** 0.00221*** 0.00181* 0.00186* 0.00271*** 0.00195*** 
(0.000644) (0.000658) (0.00102) (0.00111) (0.000748) (0.000733) 
Constant 0.932*** 0.944*** 0.935*** 0.919*** 0.913*** 0.921*** 
 (0.00937) (0.0105) (0.0212) (0.0324) (0.0156) (0.0157) 
Observations 1,465 1,465 270 270 1,195 1,195 
R-squared 0.341 0.346 0.119 0.123 0.316 0.330 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; Reference Category (distance variables): Distance (0 to 10 miles); Reference Category (bid proposals): Zero 
competitive bid proposals purchased; Reference Category (counties): Project in same county-no rival; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 (continued) 
45 
 
 
 In Louisville and northern Kentucky where market conditions are not conducive to 
collusion, single-bidder auctions result in price markups that are 9.3 percent higher than when 
there are two bidders or three or more bidders. Such auctions only occur 4 percent of the time in 
competitive counties. These results differ markedly from those in the rest of the state where 
market structure is more conducive to collusion. The price markup in single-bidder auctions in 
noncompetitive counties, which occur 56 percent of the time, is 16.5 percent greater compared 
with auctions where there are three or more bidders. When there are two bidders the markup is 
3.7 percent greater than auctions with three or more bidders. 
 In competitive counties bid pricing decisions are not significantly different when a firm is 
bidding in its own county or an adjacent county, with or without a rival firm present. County 
boundaries do not affect bid pricing decisions in these markets. In noncompetitive counties, 
however, bid pricing behavior differs considerably according to county type. Bids in counties 
where a rival firm also has a plant are 3.6 percent lower than when the firm has no rivals in the 
county, even controlling for the number of bidders. Bids in adjacent counties where there are no 
rival plants do not differ from those in the firm’s home county, but bids into an adjacent county 
where a rival firm’s plant is located are 3.4 percent higher, controlling for the number of bidders. 
County boundaries not only serve as a focal point affecting the bidding participation decision, 
they also affect how aggressively firms bid in these thinner markets. 
 
Additional Anecdotal Evidence of Tacit Collusion 
The significance of county boundaries as a focal point facilitating tacit collusion is very clear 
from the empirical results on participation and pricing. The general econometric evidence is 
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further buttressed by a number of specific examples of bidding patterns so obvious that formal 
training in econometrics is not necessary. Indeed, a probit analysis of the decision to bid for 
many firms collapses when county identifier variables are included. Figure 4 illustrates the 
bidding behavior of four central Kentucky asphalt contractors. The major urban center, 
Lexington, is located in Fayette County, which is surrounded by Scott, Bourbon, Clark, and 
Madison Counties. ATS Construction has two asphalt plants in Fayette County, which are 
indicated in the first panel of Figure 4. The projects that ATS bid on from 2005 to 2007 are 
indicated by small red dots, and projects within its service area which it feasibly could have 
served but did not bid on are indicated by small black circles. With only one exception, ATS bid 
exclusively on projects located in Fayette County, where its asphalt plants are located,45 even 
though there were dozens of projects in close proximity to its plants. ATS refrained from bidding 
on several projects in adjoining counties that were actually closer to its plants than other projects 
within Fayette County that were farther away. 
 Nally & Gibson’s bidding behavior is illustrated in the second panel of Figure 4. Its 
asphalt plant is located just north of Lexington in Scott County, and the projects on which it did 
and did not bid are indicated by red dots and black circles. Nally & Gibson bid exclusively in 
Scott County. Hinkle Contracting’s bidding behavior is illustrated in the third panel. It bid in 
Bourbon County and in counties north and west of Bourbon County, but never in Scott, Fayette, 
or Clark counties where the other three companies had asphalt plants. The Allen Company’s 
bidding behavior is illustrated in the fourth panel. Its asphalt plant is located in Madison County, 
                                                          
45 The only project outside Fayette County on which ATS bid on was located in Woodford County, where there are 
no asphalt plants. 
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on the border with Clark County. The Allen Company bid in both Clark and Madison Counties, 
but never in Fayette or Bourbon Counties where ATS and Hinkle had plants. 
 There are a number of other geographically dispersed oligopoly markets in Kentucky that 
exhibit the same collusive bidding patterns. For example, Nally & Haydon Surfacing operates 
three asphalt plants and bids in four counties in central Kentucky: Washington, Marion, Taylor, 
and Green. The location of these plants and counties can be seen in Figure 5, which also 
illustrates asphalt plants belonging to other firms in the surrounding counties. Figure 6 illustrates 
Nally & Haydon’s bidding behavior—the projects it did and did not bid on. As can be seen, 
Nally & Haydon bid exclusively in these four counties. Inspection of the bidding maps of 
surrounding paving companies reveals that no other firms bid in any of the four counties during 
the 2005–2007 period. 
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Figure 4: Bidding Behavior of Four Firms in Central Kentucky 
ATS Construction (plant locations in Fayette County)  
 
Nally & Gibson Georgetown (plant location in Scott County) 
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Hinkle Contracting (plant location in Bourbon County) 
 
 
The Allen Company (plant location in Clark County) 
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Inducing Cooperation: The Easy Way and the Hard Way 
Our discussion of tacit collusion would not be complete without examples of how rival firms 
elicit cooperative bidding behavior from one another. One easy and obvious way to eliminate 
competition is to acquire one’s competitors. In the far western corner of Kentucky, H&G 
Construction competed with Jim Smith Contracting Company and Murray Paving during the 
2005–2007 sample period. As Figure 3 shows, H&G bid extensively in the 10 far western 
counties, competing against Jim Smith Contracting in nine of the counties and against Murray 
Paving in Calloway County. Since Jim Smith Contracting and Murray Paving shared ownership, 
H&G Construction was the prototype of a “maverick firm.”46 
                                                          
46 The 2010 U.S. Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines (p. 18) recognize the 
existence of mavericks—smaller firms that have an outsized effect on competition as a result of their aggressive 
market behavior. The Guidelines suggest that acquisition of a maverick rival deserves special consideration. 
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Figure 5: Central Kentucky (District 4) Counties, Firms, and Asphalt Plants 
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Figure 6: Nally & Haydon Surfacing Service Area 
 
 
 The impact of H&G’s presence in this geographic market is evident from the bidding 
outcomes. Jim Smith won 72 contracts at an average of 5.96 percent below the state engineer’s 
estimate. Murray won 4 contracts at an average of 1.74 percent below the engineer’s estimate. 
H&G won 14 contracts at an average of 5.64 percent below the engineer’s estimate. By way of 
contrast, the Rogers Group had asphalt plants and was the only bidder in the three counties—
Crittenden, Caldwell, and Trigg—ringing the ten western-most counties in the state. Jim 
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Smith/Murray Paving did not bid into the Rogers Group’s territory, and the Rogers Group 
reciprocated. As the only bidder in Crittenden, Caldwell, and Trigg counties, the Rogers Group 
won 50 contracts at an average of 3.24 percent over the engineer’s estimate. 
 Given the nearly complete overlap of H&G’s feasible service territory with Jim 
Smith/Murray’s service territory, a cooperative outcome would not seem to be possible. Absent 
overt behavior, no obvious solution for collusion suggests itself. No solution, that is, unless the 
merger of the two firms would not trigger a Hart-Scott-Rodino notification. Indeed that was 
apparently the case, because in October 2007 Jim Smith Contracting announced that it was 
acquiring H&G Construction—an easy solution to the “problem.”47 
 Another way to induce cooperation in a repeated game is retaliation—moving 
aggressively against a rival that has abrogated a collusive agreement. Adjacent to the counties 
served by Nally & Hayden (illustrated in Figure 5) were Glass Paving and Scotty’s Contracting 
and Stone. Glass Paving had the only asphalt plant in Hart County, while both Glass and Scotty’s 
had plants in Barren County just south of Hart County. Glass Paving was the only bidder in Hart 
County, while both firms bid in Barren County. Since it had 12 asphalt plants spread around the 
region, Scotty’s bid extensively in surrounding counties as well. 
 On July 21, 2006, Scotty’s Contracting submitted a bid on a large project in Hart County, 
where it had previously refrained from bidding. Glass Paving was obviously aware that Scotty’s 
might submit a bid, because it deviated from its usual strategy in Hart County of bidding several 
percentage points above the engineer’s estimate. Glass won the bid by going 10 percent below 
                                                          
47 “Competing Contractors Combine Companies: H&G Construction Brings Strength in Bridge-building to Smith 
Contracting.” Paducah Sun, 10/4/07. 
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the state engineer’s estimate for the job, costing it well over $100,000 compared with the usual 
outcome when it was the only bidder. 
 Glass Paving had the opportunity to express its displeasure in the next KYTC bid letting. 
On August 11, 2006, Glass retaliated and bid on projects in Edmonson, Metcalfe, and Monroe 
counties. Neither Glass nor Scotty’s had asphalt plants in these counties, but previously Scotty’s 
had been the only bidder. Glass submitted bids that were 4.3 percent above, 6.9 percent below, 
and 7.3 percent below the engineer’s estimate in Edmonson, Metcalfe, and Monroe, counties 
respectively. Scotty’s won all three bids, albeit by going much lower that its previous bids in 
those counties. Apparently the message was received, because Scotty’s did not bid again in Hart 
County for the remainder of the sample period. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Detection and deterrence of collusion are perhaps the primary challenges of antitrust policy. 
Economists are frequently called upon to play the role of detective in diagnosing collusion in 
public procurement auctions. Often such collusion is overt and involves determining a winner 
and the submission of complementary bids. Alternatively, firms may reciprocally refrain from 
bidding. When the number of bidders is small and there is an obvious focal point for such 
coordination, firms may successfully suppress competition without direct communication. 
In certain geographic markets, the asphalt paving industry lends itself to such tacit 
collusion. Given the technology of paving roads, firms have limited feasible service territories. 
Thinner markets may only be able to support a limited number of suppliers. Certain elements of 
the institutions of highway procurement auctions also create a market environment that facilitates 
collusive outcomes. 
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To determine whether such collusion might occur we collected data on asphalt paving bid 
lettings by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet from 2005 to 2007. We analyzed bidding 
behavior for the 31 registered asphalt contractors in Kentucky. Whether a firm chooses to bid on 
a project within its feasible service territory was estimated as a function of cost factors such as 
distance from plant to project, capacity constraints, and scale of the project, as well as strategic 
factors such as the number of actual or potential rivals. Similarly, how much a firm bids on a 
project was also estimated as a function of cost and strategic factors. We included county 
identifier variables to see if firms use county boundaries as focal points to coordinate their 
bidding. 
After estimating these equations for the entire state, we separately analyzed the more 
competitive regions of Louisville and northern Kentucky and the less competitive regions in the 
remainder of the state. In choosing whether to bid, firms in competitive regions are primarily 
influenced by distance and are not deterred by the presence of another likely bidder. Firms in less 
competitive markets are significantly less likely to bid in an adjacent county where a rival firm 
has a plant and if another firm has indicated its intention to bid by purchasing an official set of 
project plans.  
In choosing how much to bid, the bid pricing decisions of firms in competitive markets 
are not significantly different when a firm is bidding in its own or an adjacent county, with or 
without a rival firm present. In non-competitive markets, however, bid pricing behavior differs 
considerably according to county type. Bids in counties where a rival firm also has a plant are 
significantly lower; bids in adjacent counties where there are no rival plants are essentially the 
same; and bids in adjacent counties where a rival firm has a plant are significantly higher than 
bids in counties where a firm has the only plant. 
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Since 72 of 120 counties in Kentucky have only one asphalt plant, it is not surprising that 
county boundaries are such an obvious focal point for firms to coordinate bidding activity. The 
upshot is that 64 percent of asphalt paving contracts attracted only a single bidder from 2005 to 
2007. Controlling for other factors, winning bids for single-bid asphalt projects were 9.3 percent 
higher than winning bids in auctions with three or more bidders in the competitive regions of the 
state. In noncompetitive regions, the price markup in single-bid auctions was 16.5 percent greater 
than in auctions where there were three or more bidders. Since Kentucky spent over $590 million 
on asphalt paving contracts during the sample period, the potential savings from increasing 
competition are substantial. 
Several policy changes suggest themselves. First, Adam Smith would probably 
discourage KYTC-sponsored social functions for contractors on the eve of a bid letting. Second, 
requiring bidders to publicly declare their intent to bid by publicizing the list of firms that have 
purchased official plans allows rivals to adjust their bids downward in response to the threat of 
entry, and thereby reduces the expected gain and hence likelihood of entry by a non-cooperating 
bidder. It would be simple and easy for KYTC to distribute plans freely to any contractor that 
could feasibly carry out a given project, and to delay revealing the identity and number of 
bidders until bids are opened. A final change likely to enhance competition in highway 
procurement auctions would be to remove the focal point that facilitates collusion, namely, the 
delineation of projects by county lines. The state could even go one step further and structure 
projects so that they are within the potential service territories of multiple asphalt plants. 
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